This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T SANAA 002335

engagement with this unit.

SIPDIS

FOR PM A/S BLOOMFIELD FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2013

TAGS: PINR POLM YM COUNTER TERRORISM
SUBJECT: MAKING THE MONEY WORK IN YEMEN; ON-GOING SUPPORT FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION

Classified By: Ambassador Edmund J. Hull for reasons 1.5 (b and d).

- 11. (u) This is an action request. See paragraph 6.
- 12. (s/nf) Summary/comment: We need to stay engaged with the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) to ensure that Yemen continues to support U.S. counter-terrorism efforts. In order to be successful, we must both continue current levels of assistance -- both for security and for economic development -- and find ways to sustain and expand the programs we have created. In 2003, the ROYG publicly designated their Ministry of Interior's Central Security Force (CSF), the National Counter-terrorist (CT) Force of Yemen. This was due in large part to the specialized training the unit received from U.S. and U.K. military personnel. In the short while since the unit's designation as Yemen's National CT Force, they have conducted several successful CT operations. However, sources of funding for this unit are severely limited. We need to stay engaged with the ROYG, and the CSF in particular, to ensure that Yemen continues to take aggressive action against terrorism and does not revert to being a haven for extremists or terrorists. If the U.S. expects the ROYG to be a useful partner in CT matters, a solution for sustainable funding will have to be found. End summary/comment.
- 13. (s/nf) Training and materiel support for the Central Security Force (CSF) is the cornerstone of our CT engagement in Yemen. The CSF's participation and outstanding performance in a July 2003 operation in Abyan to defeat terrorists who had attacked a ROYG medical convoy the previous month is an obvious example of the benefits of providing this training. Elements of the Ministry of Defense along with Ministry of Interior U.S.-trained CSF soldiers killed or arrested the terrorists, who were holed up in caves. In April 2003, this 50-member unit also captured Hamza Majali and Fawaz Al-Rabii AKA Furgan. Furgan was a designated USCENTCOM High Value Target (HVT). The CSF are training hard and operating aggressively against terrorism in Yemen. They represent our most notable success in getting the ROYG to take action and we currently do not have a reliable, long-term solution for funding
- 14. (s/nf) Military offices at Post have utilized a variety of sources to fund training the CSF to date. The training conducted in FY 2003 was funded using Title 10, Commander's Initiative Funds (CIF). These funds were authorized by the Joint Staff but are not allowed to be used on the same project two years in a row. Fortunately, USCENTCOM recently received some FY 2003 CT Supplemental funds and has agreed to cover the costs of training the CSF throughout FY 2004 using these funds. However, CIF and CT Supplemental funds are neither reliable nor sufficient to maintain long-term, productive engagement with the CSF.
- 15. (s/nf) Foreign Military Funding (FMF) and/or International Military Education and Training (IMET) monies would appear to be possible long-term solutions, but there are legislative constraints against using FMF or IMET funds for training outside the control of a country's Ministry of Defense. This issue was brought to the attention of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) Staffer Randy Bookout and General Counsel Richard Douglas when they visited Sana'a in August. Bookout and Douglas suggested the possibility of a legislative fix to expand the scope of permissible uses for FMF funding and promised their support for a solution in Washington.
- 16. (s/nf) Action request: I would like to request your assistance resolving this issue and identifying an on-going source of funding for sustaining U.S.-Yemen military cooperation with the CSF.